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Psychologists of religion engage in a lively discussion about the proposal to rename their field 
of study, and at least to add “spirituality” to its designation. In 2003 Division 36 of the 
American Psychological Association (APA) “psychology of religion” hosted a discussion that 
included several past presidents of the division to debate the merits of a name change 
(Hathaway et al., 2004). In 2004 the board of Division 36 decided to have membership vote 
on whether or not to change the name of the division to “psychology of religion and 
spirituality.” The majority of those returning ballots voted to change the name, but due to a 
technicality regarding the number of voters returning ballots the name remains “psychology 
of religion.” However, in anticipating the name change, Ray Paloutzian and Crystal Park 
titled their handbook “Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality” (Paloutzian 
& Park, 2005). Likewise the division will launch a new journal that goes by the name 
“Psychology of Religion and Spirituality,” edited by Ralph Piedmont with the first issue 
scheduled for the Spring of 2009. Can we imagine having a discussion about renaming AAR 
the “American Academy of Religion and Spirituality”? 
Many articles use “religion” and “spirituality” side by side or use a slash between 
these words. In areas such as health, articles are now more likely to refer to spirituality rather 
than religion (Miller & Thoresen, 2003). The sympathy among health professional for 
spirituality is part of an empirically documented gap between all professionals and the larger 
lay public with respect to religious commitment. For instance, it is well established that 
academics are more sympathetic to oppositional forms of religious commitment (sects and 
cults) than the lay public at large.1  
The tolerance for oppositional religious groups among opinion leaders is paralleled by 
the empirical fact that mental health professionals are among the least religious persons, 
preferring instead to identify with spirituality. Shafranske (1996) has reviewed the empirical 
research on the religious beliefs, associations, and practices of mental health  professionals. 
Focusing primarily on samples of clinical and counseling psychologists who are members of 
the American Psychological Association, Shafranske notes that psychologists are less likely to 
believe in a personal God, or to affiliate with religious groups, than other professionals or the 
general population. In addition, while the majority of psychologists report that spirituality is 
important to them, a minority report that religion is important to them (Shafranske, 1996, p. 
153). Shafranske summarizes his own data and the work of others to emphasize that 
psychologists are more like the general population than was previously assumed. However, 
Shafranske lumps together various indices as the “religious dimension,” and this is very 
misleading. In fact, psychologists neither believe, practice, nor associate with the institutional 
aspects of faith (“religion”) as much as they endorse what Shafranske properly notes are 
“noninstitutional forms of spirituality” (p. 154). One could predict that in forced-choice 
contexts they would be most likely to be “spiritual” but not “religious.” This indicates 
ambivalence among psychologists regarding religion.  
 This uncertainty and ambivalence surrounding spirituality and religion concerns the 
level of conceptualization. Therefore we need to engage in serious reflection about the 
concepts. We will discuss this and add our own proposal. However, since no one in the field 
can ignore the spectacular increase in popularity which the self-identification of “being 
                                                 
1 This is evident from results of O’Donnell’s (1993) study of tolerance for new religious movements in 
the United States for various opinion leaders and the lay public. On questions such as “There should be laws to 
prevent groups like Hare Krishna from asking people for money at airports”, “It should be against the law for 
unusual religious cults to try to convert teenagers”, or “There should be laws against the practice of Satan 
worship”, and a rating scale of 1=No and 2=Yes, the lay public (n=1,708) scored 1.45, ministers as part of the 
religious elites (n=101) scored 1.58, but academics (n=155) scored 1.87 and thus indicated highest agreement. 
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spiritual” enjoys these days, we begin with the presentation and discussion of some recent 
data.  
1 Situational Changes: Research on “Spirituality” 
The Bielefeld-Based Cross-Cultural Study of Deconversion in which both authors of 
this article, Ralph Hood and Heinz Streib, directed teams in Chattanooga and Bielefeld that 
have worked together in a cooperative transatlantic research project,2 we have interesting 
results not only on disaffiliation – which we call deconversion –, but also rather surprising 
results on self-identified “spirituality”. 
We have asked more than a thousand members of religious organizations and some 
130 deconverts the following set of forced-choice questions: “Mark the statement which most 
identifies you. I am more religious than spiritual. I am more spiritual than religious. I am 
equally religious and spiritual. I am neither religious nor spiritual.” Here are our results: 
 
Figure 1. Spiritual/Religious Self-Identification of Members and Deconverts in the U.S. and Germany 
(Source: the Bielefeld-Based Cross-Cultural Study of Deconversion) 
10.1%
46.7%
36.9%
6.0%
6.1%
13.6%
63.6%
16.7%
43.3%
32.6%
18.3%
5.9%
19.2%
23.1%
36.5%
21.2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Members
USA      
(n=651)
Deconverts
USA    (n=66)
Members
Germany  
(n=356)
Deconverts
Germany   
(n=52)
I am neither religious nor
spiritual
I am more spiritual than
religious 
I am equally religious and
spiritual
I am more religious than
spiritual
 
As Figure 1 shows, our results appear to reveal high numbers of people who self-identify as 
being “more spiritual than religious.” When we do not separate out members and deconverts 
(as was done for the above Figure), we count about  20% “more spiritual” subjects in 
Germany, and about 40% “more spiritual” subjects in the United States. These numbers not 
                                                 
2 Results of our Bielefeld-Based Cross-Cultural Study on Deconversion are summarized on our web site 
at www.uni-bielefeld.de/dconversion and will appear in a book (Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009). 
Field work was completed in 2005 and included a total N of 1,197 research participants. It should be noted, 
however, that our data set is not representative in regard to the general population, but includes only members 
(n=1,067) or former members (i.e. deconverts, n=130) of religious organizations with an intended rather strong 
over-representation of members in new religious fundamentalist (oppositional) and small church 
(accommodating) organizations; thus mainline religious organizations represent less than 50% (n=501) of our 
data. 
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only reconfirm the rather high preferences for the “more spiritual” self-identification of 
previous studies, but our results are even considerably higher in regard to the number of 
“more spiritual” self-identifying individuals.3  
However, the real surprise are the deconverts: The deconverts’ preference for the self-
identification as being “more spiritual than religious” almost doubles – to the effect that we 
count 36.5% of deconverts in Germany who self-identify as being “more spiritual than 
religious”; in the United States the “more spiritual” deconverts group is even 63.6% which is 
almost two third of the deconverts.   
For an interpretation of these rather high percentages of “more spiritual” self-
identifying deconverts, we need to take into account the variety of ways of exiting religious 
groups. The nature of the group being exited from is important. We identify three basic 
religious groups based upon their tension with their host culture: accommodating, integrating, 
and oppositional. We refer to exit strategies from these groups as, deconversion trajectories. 
These are best explored by qualitative interviews.  We have summarized this in Figure 2. 
In our sample, we have 29 deconverts who take a secular exit; they appear to terminate 
concern with religious belief altogether. The number of deconverts who exit the field of 
organized religion, however, is far greater: there are 24 deconverts who terminate affiliation, 
but continue practicing their religiosity in private (privatizing exit); also there is another group 
of 9 deconverts in our sample who after disaffiliation engage in a kind of patchwork religion 
(heretical exit). Thus almost two third of our deconverts leave the field of organized religion.4 
However, even among those who take secular exists, they only rarely self identify as atheists. 
This finding of ours is consistent with other research on secularists (Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). 
Even in the most unchurched areas of the United States such as the Northwest there are no 
more than 3% who self-identify as atheists (Keysar, 2007). Furthermore, despite low scores 
on both self identified religion and spirituality, secularists remain more spiritual than religious 
(Pasquale, 2007). 
If we then take into account how these deconverts have self-identified in terms of 
spirituality or religion, it is rather interesting, but not really surprising that a majority of 15 
out of 24 privatizing exiters self-identify as “more spiritual;” and even less surprising is it for 
the 5 out of 9 heretical exiters. But there are 8 out of 29 secular exiters who self-identify as 
“more spiritual.” Taken together, 28 out of 62 deconverts who leave organized religion self-
identify as being “more spiritual.” Here we are able to identify and shed some light on a 
segment of the religious field which has been gathering increasing interest from social 
scientists – the spirituality outside the domain of the priest and the prophet, spiritual quest 
outside organized religion (Heelas, Woodhead, Seel, Szerszynski, & Trusting, 2005; Hood, 
Hill, & Spilka, 2008).  
                                                 
3 Some of the difference of our results to the previous research can be explained with reference to the 
structure of our sample which is characterized by an under-representation of mainline religions; furthermore, we 
need to take into account, for the U.S.A., a difference in asking the question (“more … than” in our research; 
“not …, but” in most previous surveys); Also the difference may in part be due to the time difference of one 
decade or more. And finally, for the German sample, we also should add that, when separating out the mainline 
members, the percentage of “more spiritual” respondents drops to 13.2%; thus here the difference can be seen as 
within tolerance. Taken together, our results for the members of religious organizations are roughly in line with 
and confirm the trend as indicated in the surveys – with an open question for the situation in the U.S.A.. 
4 Numbers in the Figure do not sum up to the total of deconverts who were included in our qualitative 
analysis, because the religious switchers are not presented in the figure. 
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Figure 2. Deconversion trajectories in the Religious Field 
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At least three major questions are raised by theses results: Fist, what do our exceptionally 
high numbers of “more spiritual” self-identifications mean? Was there a rapid increase over 
the last years? Second, how can we explain the cross-cultural difference between lower 
“spiritual” self-identification rates in Germany and higher rates for the United States? Third, 
why do the “more spiritual” preferences in the deconvert groups in both Germany and the 
United States double? 
We also can turn the questions around and ask: What does it mean for an 
understanding of “spirituality” that preference for “spirituality” more recently is higher than it 
used to be, that U.S. respondents are higher than German respondents, and that deconverts are 
higher than in-tradition members – to the effect that almost two third of contemporary 
deconverts in the United States self-identify as being “more spiritual than religious”? 
We will briefly address all three questions. As to the first question, what the rather 
high numbers of “more spiritual” self-identification mean and whether there is an increase 
over the last years, we need to attend to some recent empirical results. We also should address 
a related question: Is the attraction to self-identify as being “spiritual” a new phenomenon? 
What does previous research tell us here?  
Houtman & Aupers’ (2007) re-analysis of the huge amount of World Value Survey 
data (n=61,352) in a sophisticated (and generally plausible) procedure document a trend to, 
what they call, a “post-Christian spirituality” in the West. In their attempt to improve the fact 
that “there are embarrassingly few studies that systematically map the worldviews of the 
unchurched” (p. 308), Houtman and Aupers (2007) present longitudinal results about the 
spread of people who associate themselves with a spiritual worldview. They document this 
trend over a period of two decades in most of the 14 countries for which they have analyzed 
the data. Based on a selection of questions such as about the image of God (personal God; 
some sort of spirit or live force; etc.), New Age affinity, disagreement with traditional 
Christian beliefs, but simultaneous disagreement with secular rationalism, this re-analysis 
reveals a clear trend in most of these 14 countries. France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
Sweden most clearly reveal a pattern of decline of traditional moral values. This could be 
explained in part with cohort replacement. From Houtman & Auper’s re-analysis, we have 
evidence for the religious fields in the United States and in Germany of a modest (U.S.A.) or 
recognizable (Germany) longitudinal trend of an increase of post-Christian spirituality over 
two decades from 1980 to 2000. But all of the survey data taken together do not allow to 
exactly quantify the emigration from organized religion(s) to the new segments in the 
religious field.   
There are however other attempts to quantitatively assess the amount of people who 
associate with “spirituality” as opposed to “religion.” As a relatively simple, but nevertheless 
effective tool for identifying “spirituality” with some precision, a set of four questions has 
been designed and used in empirical research: Are you “religious but not spiritual,” “spiritual 
but not religious,” “religious and spiritual” or “neither religious nor spiritual.” Alternatively 
some researchers use less oppositional language allowing for “more religious than spiritual,” 
“equally religious and spiritual,” “more religious than spiritual,” or “neither religious nor 
spiritual” self-identifications. These latter options can also be easily quantified by having 
participants rate themselves on Likert scales indicating degree of religiousness and 
spirituality.  However, the variation produced by slightly different methods are not our major 
concern in this paper (see Hood, 2003b; Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005). 
Marler & Hadaway (2002) report and discuss a considerable body of research in the 
United States in which the spirituality question has been asked; these studies have been 
completed in about a decade before the year 2001. From these studies, we have evidence that 
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there are between 18% and 20% who self-identify as being “spiritual, but not religious” 
(Marler & Hadaway, 2002).  
More recently, namely in 2008, the Religionsmonitor (Bertelsmann Foundation) has 
revealed new – and higher – results which almost match our exceptionally high results in the 
Deconversion Study for the U.S. sample. The Religionsmonitor has included a self-rating 
scale for spirituality next to a self-rating scale for religiosity. The combination of both self-
rating scales allows for an assessment of “more spiritual than religious” self-identifying 
participants. For the United States, the Religionsmonitor data reveal the following percentages 
of “more spiritual than religious” respondents: 25.9% Christians (n=710), 33.3% Jews (n=30), 
39.0% members of other religions, and – surprisingly or not – 47.8% religiously not affiliated 
respondents. 
In Germany, there was no research about “spiritual” preference, before we started to 
ask such questions in 2001 in a pilot study of the Deconversion Project questionnaire and in 
the study itself. In the meantime also the Religionsmonitor presents new results for Germany, 
including the “spirituality” question:5 10.1% in the Protestant churches, 8.7% in the Roman-
Catholic Church, 5.3% in the Protestant “free churches” (e.g. Methodist Church) and 16.7% 
in other Christian traditions (such as Orthodox Church, Pentecostal and charismatic groups) 
can be identified as “more spiritual”. Taken together, we count 9.3% members of Christian 
religious organizations (including all denominations, these are 68.7% of the population) who 
can be identified as being “more spiritual than religious.” Surprisingly, there are 10.0% who 
have no religious affiliation at all, but self-identify as being “more spiritual than religious” – 
and to the group without religious affiliation belong 26.2% of the German population. We can 
conclude that in Germany, almost regardless of whether they are members of a religious 
organization, about 10% identify as being “more spiritual than religious,” while in the United 
States we have about 20% or more.  
Taken together, the data indicate an increase in preference for a “spiritual” self-
identification in the last decade; but we do not have enough evidence to exactly quantify the 
increase.  
To profile the preference for a “spiritual” self-identification that understands itself in 
opposition to religion and to discuss the question whether we have a completely new 
phenomenon here, we would be advised to look at some older studies. The opposition or even 
hostility to religion, but with a struggle and search for an individualized religiosity (however 
this is called by the individual religious seeker) is captured best by qualitative studies. We 
have evidence for this both from our deconversion project and from other sociological and 
psychological studies which we will briefly – and, of course, selectively – summarize.  
At the sociological level, Roof (1993) has characterized the 76 million U.S. adults 
born in the two decades after World War II as a “generation of seekers” who are either 
“loyalists” (those who have stayed with their religious tradition), “returnees” (those who 
experimented with options before returning to their religious tradition), or “dropouts” (those 
who have left their tradition). Roof also noted that a distinguishing feature among the “highly 
active seekers” he interviewed was a preference to identify themselves as “spiritual” rather 
than “religious.” Twenty-four percent of these had no religious affiliation. Such highly active 
seekers were but a minority (9%) of all Roof’s participants, but they seem to have captured 
the interest of researchers in what we might identify as the “spiritual turn” in the scientific 
                                                 
5 The Religionsmonitor results reflect not only the relatively high number of secular self-identifications 
among church members in the German Protestant (33.4%) and Roman-Catholic (30.2%) churches, but also for 
the first time in a sample representative for the general population, the segment of “more spiritual” self-
identifications. 
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study of religion. Roof’s (1999) follow-up text reveals similar findings regarding self-
identification. Asking, “Do your consider yourself religious?” and “Do you consider yourself 
spiritual?” in nonconsecutive places in open-ended interviews (but always in that order) 
revealed an overall weak association between the two identifications (gamma = .291). 
However, among “strong believers” the association was higher (gamma = .439) than among 
“highly active seekers” (gamma = .196). Other data, including the question “Which is best: to 
follow the teachings of a church, synagogue or temple, or to think for oneself in matters of 
religion and trust more one’s own experience?” (Roof, 1999, pp. 320-321), suggested that 
those identified as seekers were least likely to rely upon institutional authority or to think that 
such authority should overrule their own conscience. An Asian American participant who was 
no longer active in the Methodist Church captured well: “You can be spiritual without being 
religious. I think religious . . . would be more specific. The faith is more specific, certain 
doctrines. Spiritual would be general, wider. I think that’s how you can be spiritual without 
being religious. Maybe even religious without being spiritual. Show up for church and go 
through the motions” (Roof, 1993, p. 78).  
Roof’s work echoes the highly popular Habits of the Heart (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, 
Swidler, & Tipton, 1996) which became the second best selling sociological work in history 
(Yamane, 2007). In it the pseudonymous Shelia Larson gave rise to the term “Sheliaism” used 
by Larson to describe her own faith. Yamane has noted if she had today’s language available 
to her during the interview she “surely would have offered up the contemporary mantra,’ I’m 
spiritual, not religious”” (2007. p. 183). 6 
At the psychological level, James Day in his Sierra Project, which was specifically 
designed to advance students’ stages of moral development, began with the 1979 class at the 
University of California–Irvine uncovered once again the dissatisfaction of many with a 
religious rather than a spiritual self-identification. A crucial aspect of this study (and its 
continuation since 1987 by researchers associated with Boston University) is the use of both 
traditional empirical and narrative-based qualitative methodologies (Whiteley & Loxley, 
1980; Day, 1991; 1994). Day (1994) reported the results of in-depth interviews with three 
Sierra participants chosen by the Boston research team after listening to hundreds of hours of 
audiotaped interviews. Day wrote up the results of an interview with one participant, “Sandy,” 
in an idiographic presentation rare in psychology.  
The interview probed Sandy’s views on both religion and spirituality – a tactic based 
upon researchers’ belated recognition that earlier Sierra participants might have purposefully 
avoided discussion of religion, especially religious beliefs (Day, 1994, p. 160). Thus questions 
on religion and spirituality were strategically placed within the schedule on subsequent 
interviews. Sandy took great care to distinguish religion from spirituality. In her words, “Reli-
gion is organized, dogmatic, and social. Spiritual is individual, intimate, personal. Religion 
tells you what is good or true and tells you who is favored and who is not. It operates in fixed 
categories. Spirituality is developed. You have to work hard at it and to be conscious about it 
and take time for it. Sometimes, in order to grow spiritually, you have to go beyond or even 
against religious doctrine.” (Day, 1994, p. 163). Sandy’s concern with doctrine was important. 
Day noted that she would probably protest if identified as a “believer.” She neither identified 
herself nor wanted others to label her as “religious” (Day, 1994, p. 165).  
 Therefore, we conclude for empirical research that we need to continue in developing 
and improving research designs and measures that allow the investigation of un-organized and 
                                                 
6 Thus, the emergence of the discussion of spirituality among sociologists of religion parallels our 
discussion of Troeltsch below by identifying a vocal minority of highly active seekers whose spirituality is most 
typically identified as mystical and unchurched (Hood, 2003b). 
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experience-oriented religion. And, if we do not want to foreclose of suppress unchurched 
research participants or those who oppose or hate religion, measures should not use the 
semantics that are associated with traditional religion, but rather allow for an indication of 
invisible or implicit religiosity. If Hood (2006) is right with his assumption that mysticism in 
contemporary empirical research can be identified by questions that elicit a “spiritual, but not 
religious” self-identification, supposedly, contemporary “spirituality” can be identified by 
scales measuring mysticism (Hood, 1975). 
Now to our second question. As we have seen, the rise in popularity to self-identify as 
“more spiritual” is visible in both the United States and Germany, but of course on different 
scale. We say “of course”, because in the empirical study of religion we almost take for 
granted what in fact is an unresolved puzzle. This is our second question. Call it “Euro-
secularity” or “extraordinary religiousness of US population” – the data on belief in God, 
church attendance, personal prayer and a row of similar religious items are exceptionally high 
for the US population compared to most European countries. Of course, we need to 
differentiate: Europe itself is a patchwork of highly religious and highly secular countries; and 
also in the United States a difference is evident between the more secular Northwest and part 
of the Northeast, on the one hand, and the Bible belt, on the other (Kosmin & Keysar, 2007). 
But no doubt the difference between the continents is extraordinary. What is the explanation? 
We certainly have some speculations, but if we knew the answer, we certainly would present 
it here – and get the applause from our colleagues in the field.  
The research which is available does not help to finally resolve the Euro-secularity 
puzzle. Our theme here is “spirituality” and, surprisingly or not, such extraordinary 
transatlantic difference in religiosity is reflected also in the preference for “spirituality”. What 
does this mean? It could indicate, especially for the US respondents, that religiosity and 
“spirituality” have a common ground. The majority self-identifies as being “equally religious 
and spiritual;” this supports the common-ground-hypothesis. We could then assume that the 
“spiritual, but not religious” or “more spiritual than religious” respondents simply reject 
organized religion, rather than the search for a transcendent or the sacred of some sort 
altogether. There is a documented history of this in America (Fuller, 2002). 
This connects to the third question that we have raised: Why do the “more spiritual” 
preferences in the group of deconverts double? Our answer is simply this: The doubling of 
self-identified “more spiritual” subjects in the group of deconverts is due to the fact that 
leaving a tradition involves distance from at least one church or religious organization. A 
considerable part of the deconverts7 is left with no more than their own individual religiosity, 
but will be reluctant to call this kind of individual religiosity a “religion”, because, following 
a contemporary semantic tendency, the word “religion” is strongly associated with 
organization, membership and tradition. Religion has always be identified as multi-
dimensional with religiosity or religious experience identified as one of it’s dimensions.  Thus 
to restrict religion to institutional norms and practices is but to reify religion with only some 
of its dimensions and to re-identify religiosity as spirituality with little gain in conceptual or 
empirical clarity (Hood, 2003b; Hood, Hill et al., 2008). Thus, perhaps, self-identified 
“spirituality” does not mean much more than “religion”, namely un-organized individualized 
religiosity. The “spiritual” self-identification may indicate rejection of organized religion, but 
not of religiosity. This perfectly harmonizes with the common-ground-hypothesis, but 
suggests an explanation which is possible on the basis of our data from the cross-cultural 
study on deconversion.  
                                                 
7 We talk, to be sure, about the cases who did not terminate concern with religion altogether as we see 
this in secular exists. 
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2 Reactions on the Conceptual Level: Definitions and 
Changes of Terminology 
Kenneth Pargament and his group of researchers have taken the lead not only in 
research on the spirituality/religion question, but also in the task of developing and discussing 
conceptualizations. Therefore we take this proposal as starting point. 
Pargament (1999b; Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005) defines religion as “a search for 
significance in ways related to the sacred” and spirituality, in almost the same words, as 
“search for the sacred”. When Pargament immediately adds that spirituality is the “most 
central function of religion” and the “heart and soul of religion” (1999b: 12), we can conclude 
that religion and spirituality are closely related and intertwined. Both religion and spirituality 
are defined by the relation to the scared. The sacred, Zinnbauer and Pargament (2005: 34) 
state, is the “substantive core of both religiousness and spirituality”; the scared is the specific 
difference “that distinguishes these phenomena from all others”. 
The sacred thereby refers not only to God, higher powers and transcendent beings, but 
to a broad variety of aspects of life: “Virtually any dimension can be perceived as holy, 
worthy of veneration or reverence” (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005: 34). The critical question 
of Robert Emmons and Cheryl Crumpler (1999) in their response to Pargament’s 1999 article, 
namely the question, “Can we leave God out?”, has stimulated Pargament to be more explicit 
about his understanding of the sacred. While the sacred, he explains in his reply, is in certain 
cases “clearly derived from the divine” (1999a: 38), there are however other processes in 
which “perception of divine-like qualities in objects are not necessarily rooted in beliefs in 
God”. And he goes on to explain that “for atheists and others as well, it might be useful to 
think of sacred objects as ‘functionally autonomous’ from God. The sacred object is no longer 
directly associated with the divine, however it continues to be imbued with divine-like 
qualities.” (1999a: 39). We prefer to identify vertical and horizontal dimension of 
transcendence. The vertical dimension may reference God, but the horizontal need not. 
Horizontal transcendence may be purely secular (Elkins, 2001; Comte-Sponville, 2007). An 
example is many of the ecological movements based upon purely secular scientific 
assumptions in which the self is nevertheless seen as embedded in a unity larger than itself. 
When it comes to clarifying the difference between religion and spirituality, 
Pargament argues that religion is the broader construct, a “broadband construct” which 
“encompasses the search for many objects of significance”, while “spirituality focuses on the 
search for one particular object of significance – the sacred” (1999b: 13; cf. Zinnbauer & 
Pargament, 2005: 36). Here, we may find the reason why ‘significance’ is included in the 
definition of religion, but is left out in the definition of ‘spirituality’. Religion “addresses a 
wider range of goals, needs, and values than spirituality” (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 2005: 37). 
Pargament’s argument goes on that the more “objects of significance in life are sanctified”, 
the more the difference between ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’ disappears (1999b: 14). In our 
reading, Pargament has in mind a model about the difference of religion and spirituality 
which, for religion, regards the definitional characteristic of “relation to the sacred” less 
important, while the “search for significance” serves as the key characteristic. Here we must 
point to a conceptual inconsistency: While, on the one hand, the sacred is assumed being the 
“substantive core of both religiousness and spirituality”, when spirituality and religion are 
seen in comparison, on the other hand, this characteristic appears to apply only for spirituality 
in the full sense, while religion also includes a wide variety of non-sacred, i.e. secular goals. 
What we find remarkable and whish to underscore as potentially helpful insights from 
Pargament are the following: First, religion and spirituality are closely related. Second, it is 
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the sacred which is “central to both religion and spirituality” (1999a: 37). Third, the sacred 
thereby is very broadly understood to include sacred objects which need not be associated 
with God or the divine.  
However, while Pargament focuses upon the search for the sacred, we wish to balance 
this with a long tradition of relating religion to a response to the sacred. While the former 
places emphasis on the agent’s action, the latter focuses upon the agent’s response and places 
religious experience at the forefront. Two examples that can readily be cited are in the works 
of Rudolf Otto (1917) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1799).  Recently, Otto’s work has been 
shown to help illuminate the numinous elicited by handling serpents (Hood & Williamson, 
2008, pp. 113-114). Likewise, Hood (1985, pp. 571-574) has emphasized that a re-evaluation 
of Schleiermacher’s concept of religious feeling centers upon a response to the sacred as 
integral to religiosity and shelters religious experience from a too strict social 
constructionism.  Bettis (1969, p. 144) has suggested that Schleiermacher’s notion of religious 
feeling has been misappropriated by social scientists and is better understood as a response 
that elicits an “immediate self-consciousness.” We will return to Schleiermacher below. Here 
we merely emphasize that a response to the sacred can precede and even inform the search 
for the sacred. It also highlights religious experience or religiosity as an integral part of the 
study of religion without the necessity for identifying this as a separate filed of study called 
“spirituality”. 
The major question which we raise is this: Why at all do we need two concepts, when 
their difference is so marginal? Is it not a waste of time and energy to develop special 
measures of spirituality, if they, as Pargament (1999b: 8) himself notes, “look suspiciously 
like old measures of religiousness” and add little or no incremental validity to the study of 
religion. Most measures of spirituality operate empirically as measure of religious experience 
(Gorsuch & Miller, 1999; Hood, 2003b; Hood, Hill et al., 2008). 
In an multi-author article (Hill et al., 2000), “Conceptualizing Religion and 
Spirituality”, in which Pargament is co-authored among others by Peter Hill and Ralph Hood, 
we find further assertions that religion and spirituality are the same. The authors define both 
spirituality and religion in exactly the same words, namely as “the feelings, thoughts, 
experiences, and behaviors that arise from a search for the sacred”. Because of the identical 
wording of both definitions, it is in fact questionable whether spirituality and religion have 
any features distinct enough to suggest two concepts and justify two sets of measures. When, 
furthermore, the term sacred is defined as referring to “a divine being, divine object, Ultimate 
Reality, or Ultimate Truth as perceived by the individual”, both religion and spirituality are 
conceptualized rather in the tradition of a substantial definition of religion, but very open in 
the variety of individual symbolizations. And in regard to these symbolic characteristics, the 
authors do not see any difference between religion and spirituality.  
The authors anyway suggest a difference between religion and spirituality by ascribing 
certain additional characteristics only to ‘religion’: first that only in religion, a potential 
“search for non-sacred goals” could take place; second, that (only) religion involves “the 
means and methods … of the search for the sacred that receive validation and support from an 
identifiable group”.  
Here is our critical reply: First, on the “non-sacred goals” which supposedly are 
included in religion: It is questionable, why this should occur only in the religious domain and 
not also in the spiritual domain. The authors provide no argument why spirituality is immune 
against secondary secular goals. It also is not plausible why secular (or not-yet-sanctified) 
goals should qualify as characteristics for the construct of religion proper. Second, the 
assumption that only in religion the search for the sacred receives validation and support from 
an identifiable group may refer to a specific difference that characterizes a certain type of 
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religion – or spirituality! – which has become an institution or an organization with higher 
legitimacy and tradition.  
Generally this approach, taken by its words, suggests in our reading two things: First, 
a construct ‘religion=spirituality’ or ‘religion/spirituality’ and second two subordinate sub-
constructs (one with and the other without certain additional characteristics which are due to 
the societal or organizational characteristics.  
About two decades now we witness new developments in the religious field: a 
growing preference for “spirituality” which may have seeds in the Baby Boomers generation, 
but grows and blossoms in mainstream culture at the turn of the century. And we can not see 
or predict the decline of such development. We also have seen considerable attempts to come 
to terms with this spiritual turn, but still the new, which is “spirituality”, is treated as the 
different, it is kept separate from religion or even understood as opposed to religion (Hood, 
2003b; Hood, Hill et al., 2008). The time has come for conceptual clarification. In the 
scientific study of religion, there is no need to adopt the polarization or opposition between 
religion and “spirituality” which our research participants may have in mind. It is our duty in 
the academy to aim at conceptual precision and that we are able to find this by considering 
lines of thought of 19th century and early 20th century sociology, psychology and theology. 
Here are our suggestions: 
 
3 The Contribution of the Classics  
3.1 Bourdieu’s Sociological Perspective: Spirituality in the 
Religious Field 
Starting with sociology, we may consider the famous distinction between church and 
sect which had some prominence in the sociological discourse of which Max Weber and Ernst 
Troeltsch were part.8 The church-sect distinction has become one of the basic tools for 
understanding religion in sociological terms and for constructing the religious field. This 
distinction plays a role also in the sociology of new religious movements – even though the 
terminology has changed, since we avoid the term ‘sect’ in favor of ‘new religious 
movements’. Could it be relevant also for understanding and locating “spirituality”? 
Taking a closer look into Weber’s work, especially in his analyses in Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft  (Weber, 1921), we find a distinction between three parties or three actors, rather 
than between two: not only the sects with their prophets compete with the churches and their 
priests; the third party are the magicians. What has been widely ignored, but is the longer the 
more “necessary and adequate” (Daiber, 2002: 329), is a reminder that also Troeltsch 
(Troeltsch, 1911; 1912) talks about three types. He called this third type mysticism.9  
Troeltsch’s theory, as developed in The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 
was clearly using an expanded typology derived from Weber in which, besides church and 
sect as forms of religious organization, he identified a third type: mysticism. Ironically, 
Troeltsch was popularized among North American scholars by H. R. Niebuhr, especially in 
                                                 
8 Cf. e.g. the Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages von 19.-22. Oktober 1910 in 
Frankfurt a. M. (Simmel, 1911). 
9 Troeltsch’s mystic of course is different from Weber’s magician. The magician is characterized by 
Weber as practitioner of magic coercion, a “small independent entrepreneur hired by private individuals on an ad 
hoc basis and exercising his office outside any recognized institution, most often in clandestine manner”, as 
Bourdieu (1987: 134) summarizes Weber’s perspective. 
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his The Social Sources of Denominationalism (Niebuhr, 1929) which was first published in 
1929 and thus antedating the English translation of Troeltsch’s text by 2 years. Niebuhr 
however dropped Troeltsch’s third type, mysticism, so that subsequent theorizing and 
empirical research on church-sect theory has largely ignored mysticism. The reasons for this 
are in dispute, but it is clear that neither Niebuhr nor Troeltsch thought fondly of mysticism 
and that neither saw it as characteristic of the North American religious landscape (Garrett, 
1975; Steeman, 1975). Whatever the reason, as Garrett (1975, p. 205) has noted, mysticism 
has experienced “wholehearted neglect” at the hands of sociological investigators. Among 
psychologists, the wholehearted neglect is of a historically grounded theory.  
However this may be, a general theory of mysticism in the tradition of Troeltsch 
should differentiate even more clearly and incorporate two kinds of mysticisms – that within 
the church and what Parsons (1999, p. 141) has called “unchurched mysticism.” According to 
both Bouyer (1980) and Troeltsch (1912), one form of mysticism is an inherent tendency to 
seek personal piety and an emotional realization of a faith within the individual; it serves 
simply to intensify commitment to a tradition. The other kind of mysticism emerges 
independent from, or as a reaction to, the church or the sect; thus  it does become a new social 
force. In the widest sense, mysticism is simply a demand for an inward appropriation of a di-
rect inward and present religious experience (Troeltsch, 1931, p. 730). It takes the objective 
characteristics of its tradition for granted, and either supplements them with a profound 
inwardness or reacts against them as it demands to bring them back “into the living process” 
(Troeltsch, 1931, p. 731). Concentrating among the purely interior and emotional side of 
religious experience, it creates a “spiritual” interpretation of every objective side of religion, 
so that this kind of mystics typically stay within their tradition (Katz, 1983).  
However, Troeltsch also identifies a “narrower, technically concentrated sense” of 
mysticism (1931, p. 734). This is a mysticism that has become independent in principle from, 
and is contrasted with, religion. It claims to be the true inner principle of all religious faith. 
This type of mysticism breaks away from religion, which it disdains. It accepts no constraint 
or community other than ones that are self-selected and self-realized. This is what many today 
profess to be “spirituality” as opposed to “religion.”  It is essentiallly an unchurched 
mysticism. 
To summarize Troeltsch’s legacy: aside from the ideal types of church religion and 
sect religion – which both, within their realms, may embrace and nurture a kind of mystical 
inward orientation –, Troeltsch identifies mysticism as the type of Protestant religion that 
features religious individualism, develops outside of church and sect, and has no external 
organization (Daiber,  2002: 335). And this identification of religious individualism, including 
mysticism as a third ideal type, was thoughtful and perhaps ahead of his time. We witness 
today a global spread of just this kind of religious individualism. But the problem with 
Troeltsch’s expertise is that he talks about mysticism in Protestantism and rather in historical 
perspective – which means that today we need some evidence of its contemporary and cross-
religious validity. Second, there is a problem with sociological plausibility: Not only Simmel 
openly rejected Troeltsch’s third type, and Weber only tolerated it politely (see the discussion 
of Troeltsch’s lecture in 1910), but Troeltsch himself appears somewhat unclear about 
whether mysticism is a religion without any organization or whether it develops at least some 
organizational structures. Also this second question calls for clarification.  
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1971) mapping of the religious field sets the stage for a 
sociological analysis of the contemporary religious field – in which, finally, contemporary 
“spirituality” may find its proper place. The force field with its vector structure constituting 
the dynamics and the “rules of the game” in the religious field is (a) the competition between 
religious expert actors among each other and (b) the competition for influence on and 
attraction of (lay) people. Bourdieu’s model of the religious field as published in 1971 is 
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rather close to Weber’s in respect to the number of religious expert actors and their 
characterization. But it should be noted that it includes a third religious expert actor – which, 
for Bourdieu, in accord with Weber, is the magician.  
Bourdieu’s model is very helpful for understanding the relation between actors and the 
dynamics in what we, with Bourdieu, call the religious field. Two modifications however 
appear necessary to account for the most recent changes in the religious fields in the United 
States and most of Europe. First, the number and character of religious actors has to be seen in 
constant change. They have changed significantly over the last century, especially in the last 
decades. Therefore, it does not appear adequate to include only the magician as third religious 
expert actor in the religious field. At any rate, we need to include the mystic in the religious 
field.  
Second, in certain segments of the religious field, the difference between religious 
experts and lay people has declined or disappeared together with the contours of what used to 
be called an organization. Not all forms of religion give rise to the formation of a church. In 
contemporary sociology, we have a number of proposals for characterizing social units which 
are neither institutions nor organizations, but form milieus, networks or scenes (Gebhardt, 
2002). This, of course needs to be developed further as cultures changes, including increasing 
individualization, migration, social mobility, internet use and the like. The market structures 
have changed: monopolists, small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and even street traders are 
marginalized by supermarkets and internet shops. Contemporary “more spiritual, than 
religious” actors cannot easily be identified as either lay people or self-entrepreneurs. Many 
of them dwell in scenes or milieus in what we came to call the un-organized segment of the 
religious field.  
Concluding from this, we have developed a sketch of the religious field which 
includes the distinction between an organized and an un-organized segment (Figure 3). 
Understanding the figure, one should keep in mind that, in Bourdieu’s sociological terms, a 
‘field’ is a force field of interests – of special importance in our case, a field of interest in 
attracting religious clients which functions though mutual exchange of benefits. Centers of 
gravity in the religious field are different types of religious institutions, organizations or 
scenes (which only for the sake of clarity are indicated by a single circle in the figure, but are 
a variety in themselves – and, the more we move to the upper left corner, the more we have to 
deal with a plurality of small, un-organized and individualistic circles. Religious actors are 
indicated by square brackets. Inside the organizations or scenes, we have the priests, the 
prophets, the magicians and the mystics as ideal types. Different types of religious actors, on 
the side of the clients or potential customers, are attracted in different intensity by different 
types of religious organizations or scenes. The two axes that are used here to differentiate the 
types are decidedly sociological, but open to and include a theological perspective. The 
religious field can be characterized by two axes: vertical difference according to the “degree 
of organization” (from bottom to the top), horizontal according to the “mediation of the divine 
presence” (from the left to the right) – whether we have institutions, traditions, established 
religious bodies, whether religiosity is focusing on rather particular persons or beliefs (this 
can be understood with reference to Weber’s notion of charisma, thus be called charisma-
oriented, and finally marginal mediation or even the absence of any mediation featuring 
immediacy of the individual to the transcendent or the divine presence.10 
 
                                                 
10 This pattern of two axes correspond to the way, Heinrich Schäfer (1992) has used to classify churches 
and religious groups in Central America. 
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Figure 3. The Contemporary Religious Field in Western Societies 
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Now, where does self-identified “spirituality” find its place in the religious field? It is 
in the upper left corner where the preference for immediate individual experience of the 
divine presence comes together with low or zero degree of organization. But – and this is the 
core of our argument – “spirituality” finds its place within the religious field, it is part of the 
religious field, even though belonging to its un-organized segment.  
 
3.2 James’ Psychological Perspective: Spirituality and the 
Psychological Region of Religion 
William James’ work is another classic which should be regarded an authority especially for a 
psychological perspective on religion. James’ famous definition of ‘religion’ “feelings, acts, 
and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (James, 1902, p. 72) has been 
influential and inspiring for psychology of religion. It is our thesis that this definition of 
religion embraces and includes “spirituality” already and we try to add some plausibility to 
this thesis.  
Certainly, “spirituality”, as it is used today, is not James’ term; he rather speaks of 
mysticism and other forms of relation to the divine. But certainly for him, “spirituality” does 
not stand in contrast or opposition to religion. On the contrary, James suggests understanding 
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the “godless or quasi-godless creeds” which he finds in Emmerson or in Buddhism as religion 
– and immediately adds that, for an adequate understanding, the ‘divine’ needs to be 
understood “very broadly”: 
"We must …, from the experiential point of view, call these godless or quasi-godless creeds ’religions‘; and 
accordingly when in our definition of religion we speak of the individual's relation to ’what he considers the 
divine,’ we must interpret the term ’divine‘ very broadly, as denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be 
a concrete deity or not." (James, 1902, p. 77) 
Consistent with such broad understanding of the divine is a surprisingly broad variety 
of forms of relation to whatever the individual may consider the divine. The interesting point 
in the context of our argument is not so much the variety of religions experiences, but the fact 
that, for James, all of them go by the name religion.  
The conclusion in face of such variety of forms which are all embraced and included 
in religion is James’ suggestion of a common ground of all religious experience:   
“When, in addition to these phenomena of inspiration, we take religious mysticism into the account, when we 
recall the striking and sudden unifications of a discordant self which we saw in conversion, and when we 
review the extravagant obsessions of tenderness, purity, and self-severity met with in saintliness, we cannot, I 
think, avoid the conclusion that in religion we have a department of human nature with unusually close 
relations to the transmarginal or subliminal region. … [This] region, then, is obviously the larger part of each 
of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or 
unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the 
springs of all our obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. Our intuitions, 
hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational operations, 
come from it. It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical 
experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and "hypnoid" 
conditions, if we are subjects to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas, and hysterical, accidents, if we are 
hysteric subjects; our supra-normal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. It is also the 
fountain-head of much that feeds our religion. In persons deep in the religious life, as we have now 
abundantly seen— and this is my conclusion— the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any 
rate, experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious 
history." (James, 1902, pp. 927-929) 
In our reading of this conclusion of William James, we find strong arguments for an 
inclusion of what we today call “spiritual” experiences into the domain of ‘religion’. Or the 
other way around: to define ‘religion’ so broadly to include all so-called “spiritual” 
experiences.  
We must remember that, for James, the natural assumptions he restricted himself to in 
the Principles of Psychology (James, 1890) were superceded by the phenomenal facts of 
experience documented in the Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). For James the switch 
from the natural science assumptions of the Principles gave way to the rich phenomenological 
description of the Varieties where religion is centered on religiosity. The territory now 
claimed for “spirituality” among contemporary scholars is already well marked out as an 
integral part of the study of religion for James. The problem we have created with large 
portions of research and instruments for research in the scientific study of religion is this: it is 
locked in the Procrustean bed of a limited and narrow concept of religion.  
 
3.3 Schleiermacher’s and Tillich’s Theological Perspectives: 
Definition of Religion and the Place for Spirituality 
Finally, we turn to philosophy of religion and theology. As a conceptual avenue of including 
the spiritual quest into the concept of religion, we think, psychology of religion would also 
stand on solid ground by re-considering Schleiermacher’s (1799) definition of religion in his 
speeches On Religion. Speeches to its Cultured Dispisers.  
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In approaching his new concept of religion and paving his way toward it, 
Schleiermacher, in his Second Speech, contrasts religion with two prominent ways of 
understanding religion which he energetically opposes: the definition of religion by morality 
or acting, on the one hand, and the identification of religion with metaphysics or thinking, on 
the other. The new way Schleiermacher suggests is understanding religion as “intuition and 
feeling” or, more specific, as “sensibility and taste for the infinite.” Religion, Schleiemacher 
goes on, “wishes to intuit the universe, wishes devoutly to overhear the universe’s own 
manifestations and actions, longs to be grasped and filled by the universe’s immediate 
influences in childlike passivity.” 
Schleiermacher, in his Third Speech, beautifully explicated this concept of religion, 
when he talks about his appreciation and fascination for the magic quest of the very young.  
“With great attentiveness I can observe the longing of young minds for the miraculous and supernatural. Already along 
with the finite and determined, they seek something different that they can oppose to it; they grasp in all directions after 
something that reaches beyond the sensible phenomena and their laws; and however much even their senses are full of 
earthly objects, it is always as if they had besides these yet other objects that would have to waste away without 
sustenance. That is the first stirring of religion. A secret, uncomprehended intimation drives them beyond the riches of this 
world; therefore every trace of another world is so welcome to them; thus they take delight in the stories of superterrestrial 
beings, and everything about which it is most clear to them that it cannot exist here, they embrace with all the zealous love 
one dedicates to an object to which one has an obvious right that one, however, cannot assert.” (Schleiermacher,  1799: 
59) 
It is our interpretation that this concept of “religion” describes exactly what many 
contemporaries mean when they use the word “spirituality”. But, note: it is contained in 
Schleiermacher’s conceptualization of religion.  
What does this mean for our discussion? Attending to knowledge, beliefs about the 
metaphysical realm, or attending to action, to religious conduct of life, means attending to 
derivates of religion, but not to religion itself. If we want to find religion in research, we have 
to attend to feelings and intuitions. Religion is not about grasping something, but about being 
grasped; religion is not a search for significance – and does not include secular aims, as 
Pargament would like to have it –, but a “letting go” and letting oneself be impressed and 
intuited by an incomprehensible realm: by the “infinite” or the “universe” in Schleiermacher’s 
terms. Schleiermachers term “feeling” (“Gefühl”), to be sure, is a pre-psychology and pre-
psychoanalysis term; it can not be translated with emotion or affect. Instead, it is closely 
related to “intuition”. Perhaps the most adequate contemporary term would be “experience” – 
in the literal Latin meaning of going on an expedition to encounter new phenomena, with the 
connotation, however, that this expedition may lead into an never-heard before territory of an 
other, incomprehensible world, the infinite. 
Ralph Hood (1995, pp. 571-576) has emphasized that Schleiermacher’s concept of 
religious feeling has both mystical and numinous characteristics; it is less a search for than a 
response to the sacred. In a similar fashion, James (1902, p. 481) refers to a sense of “more” 
that is integral to religious experience. Much of religion is concerned with articulating what 
this “more” is.  James’s often erroneously seen dismissal of this “more” as mere overbeliefs 
fails to appreciate that James’s insistence was on an empirically grounded theology in human 
experience. In a similar fashion, Schleiermacher’s “sensibility and taste for the infinite” is a 
form of consciousness identified with the infinity of God consciousness which can be elicited 
by a variety of finite objects, but is always in need of some theological clarification. Here 
again is more than ample room for the range of experiences which many would treat as 
“spiritual,” but which have classically been acknowledge as the proper domain of religion. 
Let us add another insight from the philosophy of religion and theology: Paul Tillich’s 
understanding of religion. It has much in common with Schleiermacher’s conceptualization, 
but Tillich’s definition works with the concept of “ultimate concern” and thus highlights 
another aspect more clearly. Interesingly enough, Tillich introduces the phrase of “what 
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concerns us ultimately” in his reflections about “The Reality of God” in Volume One of his 
Systematic Theology (Tillich, 1951: 211ff.). He explains that ”(t)his does not mean that first 
there is a being called God and then the demand that man should be ultimately concerned 
about him. It means that whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him, and, 
conversely, it means that a man can be concerned ultimately only about which is god for 
him.” Here we encounter a rather constructivist conceptualization at the heart of a substantive 
understanding of ‘religion’. 
What we think is important and should be considered in our work on the 
conceptualization of ‘religion’ is the notion of ultimacy. Tillich explains (cf. also Tillich, 
1957) that humans are concerned about many things, but there is a hierarchy of concerns – 
and (only) what concerns us ultimately is God (for the individual person). Tillich’s way of 
conceptualizing religion could help the scientific study of religion in the social sciences to 
come to terms. And we are not the first to suggest this. Robert Emmons (1999) has published 
a book with the title “The Psychology of Ultimate Concerns.” The problem however with 
Emmon’s proposal is the that he made a plural for a concept that does not allow for a plural; 
thus the contradiction is already in the title of the book – foreshadowing a problematic 
construction of measures and research design. The reason for referring to Emmon’s 
misreading of Tillich is our intent to strongly underscore an aspect in the definition of religion 
which is widely forgotten or ignored in social scientific approaches to religion: ultimacy. To 
be sure: the ultimacy is not – and does not need to be – specified; and it is different for each of 
us. But without this hierarchy of concerns that melts in a vanishing point or in a horizon, 
theory and research about religion is left with a scattered plurality of functional and 
substantive characteristics.11 And we should not be surprised that people on the street and 
scientists invent new names now and then.  
From this perspective, we would dare to say: “spirituality” is perhaps a new attempt to 
re-claim and re-consider what used to be meant by the old word “religion”. This rather 
sympathetic interpretation of the contemporary semantic trend, however, needs to be balanced 
by conceptual scrutiny whether theory and research in the scientific study of religion should 
go with the flow of contemporary semantics. Our suggestion, from our reading of the classics, 
is this: stop, think twice and clarify concepts using the logics of definition. 
 
4 Conclusion: The Clarification of Concepts  
In the first part of our paper in which we have unfolded the question and the task, we 
have suggested, on the basis of empirical results, the hypotheses that “spirituality” and 
“religion” share common ground. Further, from the doubling of self-identified “more 
spiritual” subjects in the group of deconverts in our own cross-cultural study on deconversion, 
we could advance the more explanatory assumption that also, for many deconverts, self-
identified “spirituality” may not mean much more than “religion”, namely un-organized 
individualized religiosity. The “spiritual” self-identification may thus indicate no more or less 
than rejection of organized religion, but not rejection of individual religiousness. Now, after 
presenting some fundamental lines of thought on the conceptualization of religion, it is 
possible to draw conclusions for the conceptual level.  
Our conclusions for conceptualization are simple, but, if they are true and would find 
acceptance among our colleagues, they would change the semantics in the field considerably. 
                                                 
11 Such vanishing point of horizon is also indicated and contained in Schleiermacher’s term of the 
‘universe,’ but often this notion of ultimacy is not well understood. 
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Here are our theses. Our first thesis says: Self-identified “Spirituality” is (nothing but) 
religion. Our second thesis says: This “spirituality” is part of religion. The third thesis says: 
“Spirituality” is un-organized, experience-oriented religion.  
We could use a different adjective for this third thesis and say: “Spirituality” is 
mystical religion – in the sense of Troeltsch’s mysticism of the unchurched. Another adjective 
which may qualify here is “lived” religion. Streib has proposed this elsewhere (Streib, 2008). 
And we may be even more encouraged using this adjective after having read Meredith 
McGuire’s (2008) new book Lived Religion. The problem with adjectives such as “mystical” 
or “lived” in association with religion is this: they must clearly and unambiguously specify a 
differentia specifica. And for this purpose, we think, sociological terms are most helpful, as 
we will explain shortly. And we can refer to more empirical results that profile this 
unchurched mysticism or uncurched “spirituality.” 
Quantitative empirical support for qualitative studies in psychology that have 
identified a minority of persons intensely opposed to religion while identifying themselves as 
spiritual is readily available. For instance, Zinnbauer et al. (1997, p. 553) used a modified 
form of Hood’s M Scale (unity items only) and found that in their overall sample, self-rated 
religiousness did not correlate with mystical experience (r = –.04), but self-rated spirituality 
did (r = .27, p < .001). Furthermore, there was a significant difference between the mean 
mysticism scores for the “equally spiritual and religious” group and the “spiritual but not 
religious” group, with the latter scoring significantly higher. The percentages of self-
identification into groups (“neither religious nor spiritual,”) “religious but not spiritual,” 
“spiritual but not religious,” and “equally religious and spiritual” in Hood’s data reasonably 
parallel Zinnbauer et al.’s (1997) data for mainstream college students. The scores on the M 
Scale, as well as the group comparisons, are also consistent with Zinnbauer et al.’s data. 
However, use of the complete M Scale provides further clarification. As with Zinnbauer et 
al.’s (1997) data, the means for the two experiential factors were greater for the “spiritual but 
not religious” group than for the “equally spiritual and religious” group. However, the 
difference was not significant for the introvertive factor (one that is quite compatible with 
classical Christianity), but it was significant the extrovertive factor (an experience less 
traditional within Christianity) (see Hood, 1985). The truly significant difference lay between 
the “spiritual but not religious” and “equally spiritual and religious” groups on the one hand, 
and the “religious but not spiritual” and “neither” groups on the other. A crucial point, 
consistent with previous research, was that both “spiritual-only” and “equally religious and 
spiritual” persons reported mystical experience more often than “religious-only” or 
“nonreligious” persons. Also important was that on the interpretative factor, the “equally 
religious and spiritual” group scored higher than the “spiritual but not religious” group; again, 
however, the real difference was between these two groups and the “religious but not 
spiritual” and the “neither” groups.  
Thus we can summarize these data by stating that mystical experience (“spirituality”) 
is commonly reported by individuals who identify themselves as spiritual rather than reli-
gious, and by those who identify themselves as equally religious and spiritual. In other words, 
there is a mysticism (“spirituality”) both within and outside of religious traditions. This ought 
not to surprise us. Perhaps, as Katz (1983) reminds us, there are mystics who, even when 
struggling against their faith tradition, stay within their traditions. Religious mysticism, for 
them, is inherently conservative in this limited sense. For theses religious people, belief serves 
to adequately express their mystical experiences, and their religious rituals facilitate them 
(Hood, 1995). But for some “independent” mystics, spirituality is only constrained and 
choked by belief. These independent mystics are those who consider themselves spiritual but 
not religious.  
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Hood (2003a) has reviewed several empirical studies using various indices of 
mysticism. Overall, a clear pattern emerges: Spirituality is more closely identified with 
mystical experience, whereas religion is more closely identified with a specific religious 
interpretation of this experience. Thus the current debate on religiousness and spirituality is 
really neither new nor theoretically unexpected. It has been more than three decades since 
Vernon (1968) noted that those who answered “none” to questions of religious preference 
were ignored in the scientific study of religion. He argued that perhaps a parallel could be 
drawn to those in political surveys who identify themselves as “independents.” Such person, 
he noted, are not without political convictions (Vernon 1968, p. 223). “Spiritual but not 
religious” persons, or “nones,” are perhaps religious independents, paralleling political 
independents. In response to the question “Have you ever had a feeling that you were 
somehow in the presence of God?”, Vernon found that those who rejected membership in 
formal religious groups (the “nones”) answered either “sure” (5.9%) or “I think so” (20%). 
Thus 26% of the “nones” nevertheless thought or were sure they had had an experience of 
God. This percentage closely matches survey reports of mystical experience across a wide 
range of populations, religious and otherwise, as discussed above. They are also congruent 
with psychological research indicating that “nones” often score higher on measures of the 
minimal phenomenological properties of the experience than on the religious interpretation of 
the experience (Hood & Morris, 1981). Vernon also noted the problem that his religious 
“nones” had with using religious language to describe mystical experiences.  
So there is not simply the finding of spirituality emerging in opposition to religion, but 
the persistent failure by social scientists of religion to study the experiences of those who do 
not primarily identify themselves as religious. If these people are more willing to identify 
themselves as “spiritual” than as “religious,” it has been a social-scientific oversight to think 
that they have nothing to do with “religion.” Perhaps it is only the lack of semantic 
alternatives that triggers the preference for identification with “spirituality”. 
The conclusion from our three theses is this: There is no necessity for a conceptualization of 
‘spirituality’. We could, of course, define this term and include it into the theory of religion; 
but there is not need for this. The concept of religion is sufficient. In more technical terms: 
“spirituality” as an emic term needs to be taken seriously and we need to engage in research 
that clarifies the meanings of “spirituality” for those who identify themselves as either “more 
spiritual than religious” or as “spiritual, but not religious” (Belzen, 2008). However, as an etic 
term, ‘religion’ is sufficient, the concept of ‘spirituality’ as an etic term can go.  
To be more precise, we propose a definition tree as visualized in Figure 4: ‘Religion’ 
is the general term (genus proximum) for various forms of religion. One way of defining 
different forms that are included in ‘religion’ is to define the specific difference (differentia 
specifica) according to sociological aspects: we could use adjectives ‘tradition-guided’, 
‘charisma-oriented’ and ‘un-organized-experience-oriented’ to indicate the specific 
differences (differentiae specificae). Taking into account the changes in the religious fields in 
Western cultures, it has become a necessity to use additional signifiers in combination with 
religion. The adjectives which we have mentioned may be sufficient for the contemporary 
religious fields in the United States and most of Europe. 
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Figure 4. A Definition Tree of ‘Religion’ 
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The conclusion for scientific conceptualization and terminology would thus be the 
following: It does not make sense to invest time and energy in conceptualizing ‘spirituality’. 
This term is unnecessary for the scientific discourse and for the conceptualization of etic 
terms in empirical research. On the contrary, it is a waste of energy to develop parallel 
concepts, scales and measures. Furthermore, it is confusing to use the terms ‘religion’ and 
‘spirituality’ parallel and interchangeably (which we see in many recent publications); thus it 
does make sense to add ‘spirituality’ in names of divisions or journals. And finally, it would 
be a mistake – even though this would be a conceptually sound option – to replace ‘religion’ 
with ‘spirituality’, because it is not necessary to re-invent the wheel and cut-off a century of 
conceptual discourse. 
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